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MENS  REA IN ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIMINAL
LAW: READING  SUPREME  COURT  TEA
LEAVES
Richard J. Lazarus*
T  he most significant recent Supreme  Court environmental  case  is
undoubtedly  Babbitt v.  Sweet Home  Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon.'  At  issue  in  Sweet Home was  the  validity  of
the  Secretary  of  the  Interior's  expansive  reading  of  the  scope  of
Section  9  of  the  Endangered  Species  Act  ("ESA").2  By
administrative  rule, the  Secretary had construed  Section 9's prohibi-
tion  on  any  "taking"  of endangered  species  by  "harm[ing]"  such
species  to  include  significant  habitat  modification  or  degradation
that  actually  kills  or injures  wildlife  by  significantly  impairing  its
essential  behavioral  patterns,  "including  breeding,  feeding,  or  shel-
tering."3  The  plaintiffs  raised  a  facial  challenge  to  the  Secretary's
rule  on  the  ground  that  it  created  a  prohibition  that  Congress  did
not intend.4
There  was no obvious jurisprudential  significance to Sweet Home.
The case  was  extremely  important to be  sure, but solely because  of
its  environmental implications.  Habitat  modification  or degradation
is  the  single  greatest  cause  of  species  extinction.'  Section  9  pro-
*Professor  of Law, Washington University  (St. Louis). This article  is based
on  a talk presented at a conference  on environmental  crime  at Fordham Universi-
ty School of Law on February  29,  1996,  in New York City.
1.  115 S.  Ct. 2407  (1995)  [hereinafter  Sweet Home].
2.  Id. at 2409.
3.  50 C.F.R.  §  17.3  (1996).
4.  Sweet Home, 115  S.  Ct. at 2410.
5.  See Tennessee  Valley  Auth.  v.  Hill,  437  U.S.  153,  179  (1978);  EDWARD
0.  WILSON,  THE DIvERsrrY  OF  LIFE,  221  (1993).862  FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW JOURNAL  [Vol.  VII
vides  the  most  significant  means,  apart  from  land  acquisition,6  to
restrict  activities  that modify  or  the  degrade  habitat of endangered
species  on  private  lands.7   From  a  broader  jurisprudential
perspective,  however,  the  case  presented  a  fairly  straightforward
issue  of statutory  construction:  (1) Whether  Section  9  possesses  a
plain  meaning  capable  of  either  sustaining  or  overriding  the
Secretary's  construction;  or  (2)  whether,  alternatively,  the
Secretary's  construction  of  ambiguous  statutory  language  is
reasonable  and  therefore  should  be  sustained  pursuant  to  Chevron
U.S.A.  v.  Natural Resources Defense Council.! There  was  certainly
no  criminal  law  dimension  to  what  most would  assume  was  exclu-
sively a civil  administrative  law matter.
Those who  attended the oral argument,  however, might have been
left with a very  different impression of the  nature of the  legal  issue
presented.  The  Court  was,  from  the  outset,  preoccupied  with  the
potential criminal  prosecutorial  reach  of the  statute in the  event that
the  Court  upheld  the  government's  proffered  construction  of  the
meaning  of  Section  9's  prohibition  on  "taking."  The  questions
raised  at  argument  reflected  considerable  concern  that,  absent  a
meaningful  mens rea  element,  a  broad  construction  of the jurisdic-
tional  reach  of  the  Endangered  Species  Act  could  criminalize
conduct  lacking  the  normal  indicia  of  culpability  necessary  for
criminal  prosecution.
Indeed,  the  very  first  question  from  the  bench  by  Justice
O'Connor  concerned  not  the  meaning  of  "taking"  or  "harm,"  but
"what  the  mens rea requirement  is  under  [the]  statute"  for  criminal
prosecution.9  When  informed  that  the  statute  provided  that  "the
6.  See  16 U.S.C.  § 1534 (1994).
7.  Section  6 of the Act  provides a more limited basis  for restriction  of activi-
ties  that  degrade  species  habitat, by  mandating  that  each  federal  agency  "insure
that any action  authorized, funded, or carried  out by such agency  ...  is not likely
to ...  result  in the  destruction or adverse  modification  of habitat of such  species
which  is  determined  by  the  Secretary  to  be  critical."  16  U.S.C.  §  1536(a)(2)
(1994);  see also 16  U.S.C.  §  1532(5)(A)(i)  (1994)  (defining  "critical  habitat"  as
habitat "essential  to  the conservation of the species").
8.  Sweet Home,  115  S.  Ct. 2407  (citing  Chevron  v.  Natural  resources  De-
fense Council,  467 U.S.  837,  842-45  (1984)).
9.  Official  Transcript  of the  Oral  Argument  at 4, Babbitt (No.  94-859).  The
reference  to  Justice O'Connor  in the  text above  and  throughout  this article is  not
based  on  any  notation  in the  official transcript. That transcript  deliberately  omitsMENS REA  IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
person  must  act  knowingly,"  Justice  O'Connor  pressed  the  gov-
ernment  regarding  what  precise  facts  the  defendant  must  know,  in
particular,  whether  a  person  must  know  that  the  species  being
harmed  is  endangered."  The  government  averred  that  such
knowledge  of  the  formal  legal  status  of  the  species  was  not
required,  relying  on  the  fact  that  "Congress  specifically  amended
the  [ESA]  in  1978  to  change  the  scienter  from  wilfully  to
knowingly,  to  change  it  from  a  specific  intent  crime  to  a  general
intent  crime.""  The  government  acknowledged  that  "under  our
interpretation  of  knowingly ....  the  person  must  know  that  the
conduct  in which  he  is engaging  will  have  the  prescribed  effect  on
the  protected  wildlife."' 2  When  further  pressed  by  the  Court
whether  the  defendant  "would  have  to know,  for example - if you
drained  a pond on your property, you'd have  to know that there is a
particular frog or whatever"  to sustain a conviction,  the  government
readily  agreed. 3
Now,  this may  seem to  some to be  much  ado about  very little. A
few  questions asked  by a  Justice  at one oral  argument hardly  seem
significant,  especially  when  the  Court's  opinion  on  the  merits  left
those  issues  largely unaddressed.  Justices  often  pose  questions  that
bear little, if any, relation to  their actual beliefs  about  a case before
them.  Even  academic  mills  normally  require  more  grist  than  a
question  or two  at  oral  argument  to justify  a  contribution  to  a  law
review  symposium.
This  Essay  will  demonstrate  how  in  this  instance  much  can  be
effectively  gleaned  from  what otherwise  might  appear to be  a mere
incidental  oral  argument  colloquy  confined  forever  to  law  library
microfiche.  The essay  is structured  around three lessons  that can  be
derived  from  reading  the  tea  leaves  supplied  by  the  colloquy.
Section  I  concerns  the  source  of the  tensions  currently  underlying
environmental  crime.  Section  II  underscores  the  significance  of the
any  reference  to  individual  Justices.  The  Justice  O'Connor  reference  is  instead
based on conversations  that I had with those  who attended the oral argument  and,
therefore,  could  identify the  questioner.  Each verified  that  Justice  O'Connor was
the  questioner.
10.  Id.
11.  Id. at 5.
12.  Id.
13.  Id. at 6.
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mens  rea element  in  addressing  those  tensions  through  defining
what  is and  is not criminal  conduct  in  the  environmental  law  con-
text.  Finally,  section  III  details  the  third  lesson,  which  is  perhaps
the  most significant:  demonstrating  how the  colloquy,  including  the
tenor  of  the  Court's  questions  and  the  substance  of  the
government's  responses,  is  highly  suggestive  of  the  kinds  of
reforms  that  are  likely  to  occur  in  environmental  criminal  leg-
islation  in the near  future.
I.  THE  TENSION  BETWEEN  CIVIL  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW  AND
CRIMINAL  LAW  IN  ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIME
The impetus  for the questions regarding  the criminal  implications
of  construing  Section  9  of the  Endangered  Species  Act  in  Sweet
Home4  is  the  same  as  that  underlying  current  controversies  sur-
rounding  criminal  enforcement  of  environmental  law.  The
criminalization  of an  otherwise  civil  regulatory  scheme,  like  envi-
ronmental  law,  serves  two  reinforcing,  yet  potentially  divergent
functions.  Concern  about  the  possibility  of  such  divergence  most
likely  prompted the  Court's questions  and  likewise  underlies  much
of the  current debates  regarding  the proper scope  of criminal  sanc-
tions  in environmental  law. 5
First, imposition  of a  criminal  sanction makes  an  important sym-
bolic  statement  regarding  the  moral  culpability  of the  transgressor.
Conduct  subject to criminal  sanction  is not merely  unlawful - it is
criminal in  character.  Criminal prohibitions  serve  as  a formal  soci-
etal  statement  regarding  the  immorality  of  certain  proscribed
acts. 6  Therefore,  the  formal  equation  of  environmental  violations
14.  See supra notes 9-13.
15.  I have previously  written  at perhaps  too great length about the tension be-
tween  environmental  law  and  criminal  law  in  the  fashioning  of  environmental
criminal  law. Some of the issues discussed  in this essay  are more comprehensive-
ly  examined  in  those  earlier  submissions.  See  Richard  J.  Lazarus,  Meeting  the
Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Envi-
ronmental Criminal  Law,  83 GEO.  L. J.  2407 (1995)  [hereinafter Reforming Envi-
ronmental Criminal  Law]; Richard J.  Lazarus,  The Reality of Environmental  Law
in the Prosecution  of Environmental Crimes: A  Reply to the Department of Jus-
tice, 83  GEO.  L.  J. 2539  (1995);  Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental
Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REv.  867  (1994).
16.  Henry  M.  Hart,  The  Aims  of the  Criminal Law,  23  LAW  &  CONTEMP.MENS REA IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
with  criminal  misconduct  tends  to  clothe  the  underlying  environ-
mental  requirements  with  a  degree  of  moral  legitimacy."7  This
statement  of immorality  may  either  merely  reflect  existing  social
consensus  or  serve  as  a  stimulus  to  creating  a  new  consensus  re-
garding the  bounds of moral conduct. 8
A  strong  case  can  be  made  for  subjecting  environmental  viola-
tions  to  criminal  sanctions  on  such  moral  grounds.  The  kind  of
conduct  often  involved  in violating environmental  requirements  and
the kind of harm that results can be  virtually identical to that histor-
ically  subject to criminal  punishment. The motivation  for  the  viola-
tion  is  often  economic,  but  so  too  is  the  motivation  for  many
crimes,  ranging  from  armed  robbery,  to  embezzlement,  and  even
murder  in  many  circumstances.  And  while  the  common  theme  for
environmental  violations  is  that  the  resulting  harm  occurs  through
degradation  of  the  environment,  that  feature  does  not  reduce  the
magnitude  of harm.  Quite  the  opposite  is  true.  Environmental  vio-
lations  may  cause  catastrophic  results  to  human  health  and  the
natural environment  (and consequently  for future  generations).
Environmental  protection  also  provides  a  forceful  context  for
extending  criminal  sanctions beyond  long settled notions  of morali-
ty. The premise of much environmental protection  law  is that exist-
ing  behavioral  norms  were  flawed  and  warrant  significant  change.
The  moralizing  force  of criminal  law  - which  uses  criminal  law
affirmatively  to  educate  the  public  regarding  the  immorality  of
certain  behavior  - can  therefore  serve  to  promote  the  needed
change  in social  attitudes.
A second function  that criminal sanctions  serve  derives  from their
unique  ability  to  deter  violations.  Absent  effective  sanctions  for
their  violation,  noncompliance  with  environmental  requirements  is
PROBS.  401,  404  (Summer  1958).
17.  This point was underscored at  the Fordham  symposium when government
prosecutors repeatedly  emphasized the  word "crime"  and "criminal"  in describing
environmental  violations,  apparently  in  an  effort  to  capture  the  moral  force  of
those terms.
18.  See John C.  Coffee, Does "Unlawful" Mean  "Criminal?":  Reflections on
the Disappearing  Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law,  71  B.U.  L. REv.  193,
201,  223-233  (1991);  see also, Harry  V. Ball & Lawrence  M.  Friedman,  The Use
of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A  Sociolog-
ical View,  17  STAN.  L. REv.  197  (1965).
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reduced to merely  a cost of doing business.  Any fines imposed  may
just be passed  on by  the  company  to  consumers  of the  company's
goods  or  services  in  the  form  of higher  prices.  Even  in  the  worst
case of catastrophic  fines,  the  individual  owners  and operators  may
be  protected  from  crippling  liability  by  corporate  limitations  on
individual  liability19 or, if needed,  bankruptcy  provisions.20
The criminal  sanction,  by contrast,  cannot be  so easily passed  on
to  others,  especially  the  sanction  of incarceration.  Incarceration  is
uniquely  personal  and deprives  the  convict  of his or her  most basic
liberty  interest. The moral  stigma of such  a  conviction  can be  long
lasting  and, as  a practical  matter, can cripple  the defendant's  future
economic  livelihood.  It  can  also  destroy  the  convicted  individual's
reputation  within  his  or  her  own  community.  Thus,  the  threat  of
personal  criminal  sanction  can  prompt  far  greater  compliance  by
industry than mere  civil sanctions. 2'
The  deterrence  function  of criminal  law  can  also  be  especially
important in  the environmental  context.  Much environmental  law  is
necessarily  preventive  in  design. The laws  seek  to prevent  irrevers-
ible,  irremediable  harm  to  the  natural  environment,  the  precise
magnitude  of  which  is  often  highly  uncertain  given  the  inevitable
complexity  of ecosystems.  It is  often  quite  hard,  if not impossible,
to put  the pieces  of an  ecological  puzzle  back  together  again  in the
aftermath  of serious  environmental  degradation.  Monetary  remedies
do not address  the  damage  issue.  Moreover, natural  resource  resto-
ration may  be an  illusory goal.  Deterrence,  therefore,  can  be  essen-
tial to the  achievement of the  preventive  objective of environmental
law  to  prevent  such  harms,  rather  than  merely  to  redress  harms
19.  See,  e.g.,  N.L.R.B.  v.  Greater  Kansas  City  Refrig.,  2  F.3d  1047,  1052
(10th  Cir.  1993)  (entitling shareholders to rely on  the protections of limited liabil-
ity  where  they follow the technical  rules  that govern  the  corporate  structure).
20.  See, e.g., Arlene  E. Mirsky et al.,  The Interface Between Bankruptcy and
Environmental Laws, 46 Bus.  LAW  623  (1991).
"21.  Environmental Crimes Act  of 1992,  Hearing Before  the  Subcomm.  on
Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d  Cong.,
2d  Sess.  14  (statement  of  Rep.  Schumer);  Robert  I.  McMurry  &  Stephen  D.
Ramsey,  Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal  Sanctions in Enforcing En-
vironmental Laws,  19 LoY.  L.A.  L. REv.  1133,  1158-59  (1986).MENS REA IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
once  they have  occurred."
Although  the  moral  culpability  and  deterrence  functions  may  be
somewhat reinforcing  within  certain  bounds,  they  suggest  differing
outerbounds  regarding  the  proper  reach  of  the  criminal  sanction.
The deterrence rationale  can  logically  extend far beyond the morali-
ty  rationale,  for  example,  when  the  criminal  sanction  is  designed
simply  to  reflect  existing  social  norms  of  moral  culpability;  or
when the  sanction  is intended  to  serve  an  educational  function  and
thereby  affirmatively  affect  what those  social norms  are.
In  either  instance,  the  deterrence  rationale  typically  turns  not on
the  immorality  of the  conduct  but instead  on the  amount  and char-
acter  of the  harm  threatened,  and  therefore,  warranting  prevention.
The  greater  the  threatened  harm,  the  more  valuable  the  deterrence
effect  offered  by  the  criminal  sanction.  Although  conduct  risking
greater  harm  may,  for  that  reason,  be  considered  morally  culpable
and  warranting deterrence,  the primary  focus  of each  rationale  for a
particular  criminal  sanction  - the  moral  character  of the  conduct
versus  the  character  and  degree  of the  harm  - remains  decidedly
different.
The  deterrence  rationale  finds  its  equilibrium  at a  point  of opti-
mal compliance. That  may  or may not mean that the criminal  sanc-
tions  are  themselves  triggered  by  any  violation.  Because  criminal
sanctions  serve as  such effective  deterrents,  there might be a signif-
icant  risk  of  inducing  "overcompliance"  if  such  sanctions  were
triggered by any violation. 3
Defining  the  outer  reach  of  criminal  sanctions  for  violations  of
regulatory  laws,  like  environmental  protection  laws,  necessarily
raises  a  tension  between  these  two aims  of criminal  law  functions:
deterring  regulatory  violations  and  expressing  moral  culpability.
22.  See,  Lazarus,  Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, supra note  15,  at
2420-21.
23.  By  "overcompliance,"  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  regulated  entities
would  comply too  often  in  terms  of frequency  of compliance.  I  do  not  assume
that  Congress  intended  that  companies  would  violate  the  laws  with  a  certain
frequency. "Overcompliance"  instead  refers to  the  possibility that  regulated  enti-
ties might  reduce  pollution even  beyond  levels  society might  in fact desire - as
reflected  in mandated  levels of pollution control - in order to guard against  even
the slight  possibility of violating  a criminal  prohibition  and thus subjecting them-
selves  to criminal  sanction.
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The  Court's  questions  at  oral  argument  in  Sweet  Home  can  be
traced to  a  concern  that  the  balance  was being  struck  too  much  in
favor of the  deterrence  rationale in  possible derogation of the moral
limits  necessarily  implicated  by  criminal  sanctions.  For  just  as
criminal  sanctions  can  be  justified  by  norms  of moral  culpability,
so  too  may  the  imposition  of criminal  sanctions  in  the  absence  of
such culpability  itself run afoul of those very  same norms of moral-
ity.  There  are  limits  beyond  which  something  cannot  be  deemed
immoral  because  it  is  criminal.  And,  when  it  fails  to  recognize
those limits, the  criminal  law itself risks  moral condemnation.24
In  Sweet  Home,  this  tension  was  starkly  posed.  Extending  the
jurisdictional  reach  of Section  9  to  include  habitat modification  or
degradation  was  essential  for  accomplishment  of the  statute's  fun-
damental  purpose  of  guarding  against  species  extinction.  Endan-
gered  species  could  not be  adequately  protected  if the  federal  law
prohibited  only  actions that harmed  a  species  by the  direct  applica-
tion of physical  force  against  the  species.  The  deterrence  rationale
strongly  supported  an extension  to habitat modification  or  degrada-
tion  on the theory  that  Congress  should be presumed to have  creat-
ed a statutory  scheme that authorized the  Department of the  Interior
to prohibit those  activities  necessary  to  achieve  the statute's  funda-
mental purposes. The deterrence rationale was  also especially  strong
in  the  endangered  species  context  where  the  harm  at  stake  - the
extinction  of a  species  - is  the  paradigmatic  example  of an  irre-
versible  environmental  effect  that can  be  effectively  redressed  only
by prevention  in  the  first instance.  Once  the  species  is gone,  there
is no turning the  clock back.
Yet,  Justice  O'Connor  appears  to  have  appreciated  the  implica-
tions  of any  resulting  expansion  of criminal  sanctions.  For,  if one
were  to presume  that Congress  had not intended to expand criminal
sanctions  beyond  those  supported  by  notions  of moral  culpability,
doubt  might be  cast on  the  government's  expansive  statutory  con-
struction.  In  the  absence  of criminal  sanctions,  the  government's
24.  Francis  B.  Sayre,  Public Welfare  Offenses,  33  COLUM.  L.  REv.  55,  80
(1933);  Coffee,  Reflections on  the Disappearing Distinction, supra note  18,  at
193;  see also Sanford  H.  Kadish,  Some  Observations on  the  Use of Criminal
Sanctions in  Enforcing Economic Regulations,  30  U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  423,  444
(1963).MENS REA  IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
construction might well be  reasonable;  however, given the  presence
of criminal  sanctions  for  violations  of the  prohibition  on  "taking,"
the  Court must  take care  to ensure  against possible  overreaching  of
the  criminal  sanction  (or  at  least  not  acquiesce  too  quickly  to  the
notion  that  such  was  Congress'  intent).  Such  an  overreaching  be-
comes  a greater possibility  in moving  from the  direct application  of
force  against  the  species to  the  potentially more  causally  attenuated
harm  of habitat modification or  degradation.
The  harm  may  be  the  same  - which  might  support  the  deter-
rence function  of criminal  sanctions - but the  moral  culpability  of
the  underlying conduct  may be somewhat less.  The extension  of the
statute  to  habitat  modification  or degradation  dramatically  expands
those  potentially  subject  to  criminal  prosecution.  Those  directly
applying  force  to  a species  are  likely  to be  fully  aware of the  con-
sequences  of their  actions.  There  are  no  comparable  assurances  in
the  broader  category  of  persons  who modify  habitat  in  a  manner
that harms  a  species. The further removed "cause"  is from "effect,"
the  less likely  the  actor will  be  aware  of those effects.  Broadening
the  scope  of  activities  risks  sweeping  into  the  regulatory  ambit
individuals less sophisticated about their activities.
The  legal  context within  which  the  tension between  the  morality
and  deterrence  function  was  raised  in  Sweet  Home  is  also  signifi-
cant:  not  a  classic  criminal  law  case,  but  instead  a  civil  action
challenging  the  validity of an  administrative  agency regulation  as  a
matter of statutory construction. Justice  O'Connor's  questions high-
lighted  the  relationship  between questions  of statutory  construction
and  the  inclusion  of dual  civil/criminal  enforcement  schemes.  An
intriguing  issue  of  statutory  construction  is  implicated;  whether
Chevron  deference  applies  when  the  agency  construction  of  the
statute  at  issue  subjects  an  individual  to  severe  criminal  sanction.
Chevron and  its  progeny  in  the  Court  do  not  address  this  issue.'
The  judicial  mantra  is  simply  that  statutory  ambiguity  warrants
deference,  so  long as  the construction  is reasonable.26 But  it  is not
so clear  that  the  deference  mantra  applies  with  equal  force  when  a
criminal  sanction  is  implicated,  since  historically  a competing  can-
25.  See  Chevron  U.S.A.  v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467  U.S.  837
(1984).
26.  Id. at 844.
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on  of  statutory  construction  (the  "rule  of  lenity")  has  supported
statutory  ambiguities  being read  in  favor  of the  criminal  defendant
and not  the government.27
The  Chevron  issue  lurked  mostly  behind  the  scenes  in  Sweet
Home. The  possibility  of the Court  deciding  the  issue  unfavorably
to  the  federal  government  made  seeking  Supreme  Court  review
much  less  attractive.  Although  the  environmental stakes  in  Sweet
Home  were  huge  - leading  the  Secretary  of the  Interior  to  press
for the filing of a petition  for a writ of certiorari - the government
had  much  to  lose  if the  Court  were  to jettison  Chevron deference
whenever  a federal  regulatory  scheme  is  subject  to  possible  crimi-
nal  sanction.  The  vast  majority  of federal  regulatory  schemes,  in-
cluding  virtually  all  of  the  environmental  regulatory  programs,
include just such  a criminal enforcement  dimension.2"
Fortunately  for  the  government,  which  decided  to  take  that  risk
by taking Sweet Home to the Court,  the  plaintiffs  in the  case  never
fully pressed this submerged  aspect of the  Chevron issue  and inade-
quately  briefed  it.29 The  Court,  as  a result,  largely  sidestepped  the
issue  with  an  ultimately  vague  footnote  stating  "[w]e  have  never
suggested  that  the  rule  of  lenity  should  provide  the  standard  for
reviewing  facial  challenges  to  administrative  regulations  whenever
the  governing  statute  authorizes  criminal  enforcement."3  However,
the  Court has previously made  suggestions  to  that effect:
It is  true ...  that these  are  not criminal  cases,  but it is a crimi-
nal  statute  that  we  must  interpret.  There  cannot  be  one  con-
struction  for the Federal Communications  Commission  and another
27.  See,  e.g.,  Ratzlaf  v.  United  States,  114  S.  Ct.  655,  663  (1994)  (citing
Hughey  v.  United  States,  495  U.S.  411,  422  (1990)  ("lenity  principles  demand
resolution of ambiguities  in criminal  statutes in favor  of the defendant"));  United
States  v.  Bass,  404  U.S.  336,  347  (1971)  ("ambiguity  concerning  the  ambit  of
criminal  statutes  should  be resolved  in favor of lenity")  (citations omitted).
28.  See, e.g., Clean  Air Act,  42 U.S.C.  §  7413(c)(1)  (1994);  Clean  Water Act,
33  U.S.C.  §1908(a) (1994);  Comprehensive  Environmental  Response,  Compensa-
tion,  and  Liability  Act,  42  U.S.C.  §  9603(b),  (d)  (1994);  Resource  Conservation
and  Recovery  Act,  42 U.S.C.  §  6928(b)-(d)  (1994).  See also, DONALD  CARR  ET
AL.,  ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIMINAL  LIABILITY  (1995);  CHRISTOPHER  HARRIS  ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIMES  (1992).
29.  Brief for  Respondents  at  25,  Sweet Home,  115 S.  Ct. 2407 (No.  94-859).
30.  Sweet Home,  115  S. Ct. at 2416 n.18.MENS REA IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
for the  Department  of Justice.  If we  should  give  [the  statute]  the
broad  construction  urged  by  the  Commission,  the  same  construc-
tion  would  likewise  apply  in  criminal  cases  ....  [I]t  would  do
violence  to  the  well-established  principle  that penal  statutes  are to
be construed  strictly.31
The government  should  be  able  to  persuade  the  Court that  the
criminal  dimension  to  a  regulatory  scheme  does  not  deprive  the
appropriate  administrative  agency  of the  right  to  Chevron defer-
ence  in a  case challenging  the validity  of an agency  regulation  on
statutory  construction  grounds.  Rule  of  lenity  concerns  could  be
sufficiently redressed  in  other  ways.  Rather  than  require  that  the
statute  itself be  free  of ambiguity,  the  policies  furthered  by  the
rule of lenity  might instead  be  satisfied by clearly  drafted  agency
regulations  that  are  the  product  of  notice  and  comment
rulemaking  and  free  of  indeterminacy  and  obscurity.32  Only  in
the  absence  of the  agency  taking  the  opportunity  to  clarify  any
statutory  ambiguity  would  the  rule  of  lenity,  in  effect,  "trump"
Chevron and render  inappropriate judicial  deference  to the  agency
regarding  the  meaning of an agency  regulation  subject to possible
criminal prosecution.33
Regardless  of my  own  inclinations,  the  issue  remains  open  in
the  aftermath  of  Sweet Home, and  Justice  O'Connor's  questions
remain very  much  alive for the  government in  future  cases. They
identify  an  underlying  tension  in  environmental  crime  between
defining  such  crime  in  terms  of moral culpability  or, instead,  ex-
tending  it  much  further  to  promote  regulatory  deterrence.  They
also demonstrate  how these same  problems may bear on a  funda-
mental issue of administrative  law that the  Court will likely face
31.  Federal  Communications  Commission  v.  Am.  Broadcasting  Co.,  Inc.,  347
U.S.  284, 296  (1954).  None of the  briefs  before  the  Court,  including  many  ami-
cus  briefs,  appear to have  cited to this  case.
32.  Cf  General  Electric  Co.  v.  EPA,  53  F.3d  1324,  1329  (D.C.  Cir.  1995);
Chem.  Waste  Management  Inc.  v.  EPA,  869  F.2d  1526,  1534-35  (D.C.  Cir.
1989);  Solid  State  Circuits,  Inc. v.  EPA,  812 F.2d  383,  392  (8th  Cir.  1987);  see
Lazarus, Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, supra note  15,  at 2526-29.
33.  See  Ann  Crady, Administrative Agency Interpretation of Ambiguous Stat-
utes  with  Criminal Penalties: Should  the Rule  of Lenity  or  Chevron Defense
Apply? (May  1996)  (unpublished  student manuscript  on file  with author).
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more  directly  in  the  future,  perhaps  in  an  environmental  crime
case.
II.  THE  CENTRALITY  OF  MENS  REA  IN  DEFINING
ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIME
The  Sweet  Home  oral  argument  colloquy  also  illustrates  the
central  role  of mens  rea  in  defining  which  environmental  viola-
tions  warrant  crimifal  sanction.  The  choice  of  a  mens  rea  -
purposefully,  knowingly,  recklessly,  negligently,  or  none  at  all
(strict  liability) 4  - necessarily  implicates  the  tension  already
discussed between  the  deterrence  and  moral  culpability  functions
of  criminal  law.35  In  the  model  of  criminal  law  dominated  by
notions  of  moral  culpability,  mens  rea  is  the  defining  element.
Mens rea determines whether the conduct is  subject to moral con-
demnation. 6  Mens  rea  also  determines  whether  an  individual  is
subject  to  society's  most  severe  punishment:  incarceration,  with
loss  of  liberty,  and  even  loss  of  life  in  the  most  reprehensible
circumstances.
The  harm  caused  is  relevant,  but  only  to  the  extent  that  the
individual  subject  to  criminal  prosecution  desired or  at least  was
aware  that  she  was  causing  or  creating  the  risk  of such  harm.
Causation  of harm,  by  itself,  is  not  enough  to  trigger  criminal
sanction  absent  the  accompanying  culpable  mens  rea.  The  tie-in
between  mens rea and the resulting harm  is  one of the fundamen-
tal  dividing  lines  between  an  otherwise  blurry  boundary  between
tort compensation  schemes  and criminal  law. 7
That  is why  Justice  O'Connor  wanted  to  know  precisely  what
"[m]ust  a  person  know"  to  be  subject  to  criminal  prosecution
under  the  Endangered  Species  Act.8  She  inquired  whether  the
government  must  prove  that  a  person  "know  that  a  particular
34.  MODEL  PENAL  CODE  §§ 2.02(2)(a)(i),  2.02(2)(b)(ii),  2.02(c),  2.02(2)(d)
(1962).
35.  See supra part I.
36.  Francis B.  Sayre, Mens Rea, 45  HARv.  L. REV.  974, 982-87  (1932);  Mar-
tin R. Gardner,  The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations  on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993  UTAH  L. REV.  635,  637.
37.  Coffee, supra note  18,  at  193.
38.  Sweet Home Oral  Argument Transcript, supra note 9,  at 4-7.MENS REA  IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
animal  was  endangered., 3 9  Aware  of the  heightened  significance
of mens  rea for determining  moral culpability  if Section  9  of the
Act  were construed  to  extend  to habitat  modification,  she further
posed  the  question  whether  the  government  agreed  that  "if  you
drained  a pond  on  your property,  you'd  have  to  know  that there
is  a  particular  frog  or  whatever  ...  in  the  water  ...  before  you
could  be [convicted  of a criminal  violation of Section  9]."'
The  deterrence  function  of  environmental  crime,  however,  is
another  reason  why  it  was  so  important  for  the  government  to
stress that a person  "need  not know  that" a species  is endangered
or even  "at  risk" for  conviction  under  the  Act.4  The  government
lawyer  noted that "Congress  specifically  amended  the  act in  1978
to  change  the  scienter from  "wilfully"  to "knowingly",  to  change
it  from  a  specific  intent  crime  to  a  general  intent  crime."'42  Ac-
cording  to  the  government,  the  significance  of this  congressional
shift was  that a  defendant  need not know  that a particular animal
is  endangered  because  "[tihat  is  a  question  of knowledge  of the
law  which  is not ordinarily  required" for general  intent crimes.43
Why  is  this  more  relaxed  mens  rea  element  important  for  the
government's  deterrence  objectives?  One  reason  might  be  the
government  is  concerned  that  it  may  not  be  able  to  prove  the
facts  necessary  to  establish  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  a  more
demanding  mens  rea.  Subjective  knowledge  and  individual  pur-
pose  are  inherently  difficult  to  establish.  The  best  source  for
evidence  of  the  requisite  culpable  knowledge  and  purpose  is
inevitably  the  very  individual  - the  defendant - who  may  be
expected  to deny its existence.
Relaxing  mens  rea  therefore  can  dramatically  improve  the
prosecutor's  chance  of success.  This  is  true  for crime  in  general.
Indeed,  it is especially  so for environmental  crime,  at least where
those  violating  environmental  regulations  are  large  corporations
where individuals  making decisions  may  seek  to remain  willfully
ignorant. There  are, to be  sure,  evidentiary doctrines  and methods
39.  Id. at 5.
40.  Id. at 6-7.
41.  Id. at 4-5.
42.  Id. at 5.
43.  Id.
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of circumstantial  proof that  prosecutors  have  effectively  used  to
overcome  such  cognitive  and  institutional  barriers  to  proof  of
mens rea.4  It should not be  surprising,  however,  that prosecutors
would prefer to avoid  the burden of such  proof altogether.
Thus,  mens  rea  becomes  the  central  subject  in  a  tug  of  war.
Moral  culpability  and  deterrence  pull  in  opposite  directions;  ulti-
mately  an  equilibrium  between the  two  is struck.  It is  the precise
location  of that point of equilibrium  - now  and  in the  future -
that is the subject  of the  third lesson of the Sweet Home colloquy.
III.  THE  INSTABILITY  IN  CURRENT  MENS  REA  DOCTRINE  IN
ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIME
To  date,  the  federal  government  has  largely  prevailed  in  its
efforts  to  reduce  its  evidentiary  burden  in  demonstrating  that  a
particular defendant  possesses  a mens  rea sufficiently  culpable  to
warrant  a  felony  sanction.45 The  lower  courts  have  generally  ac-
quiesced  in the government's  contention  that the  Supreme  Court's
decision  in  United States v. International  Minerals and Chemical
Corp.'  warrants  interpreting  the  "knowingly  violates"  language
of  various  environmental  felony  provisions  as  requiring  proof
neither  of the  defendant's  knowledge  of the  relevant  law  nor  of
all  the  relevant  facts  that  render  the  defendant's  conduct  a  felo-
ny.
47
44.  Liparota  v.  United  States,  471  U.S.  419,  434  (1985)  (commenting  on
ability  of government to prove by circumstantial  evidence  defendant's  knowledge
of conduct's culpability);  United States  v.  MacDonald  & Watson  Waste  Oil Co.,
933 F.2d  35, 55  (1st Cir.  1991)  (willful blindness instruction).
45.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Laughlin,  10  F.3d  961  (2d  Cir.  1993),  cert.
denied Goldman  v.  United  States,  114  S.  Ct.  1649 (1994).
46.  402 U.S.  558  (1971).
47.  United  States  v.  Hopkins,  53  F.3d  533,  537,  540  (2d  Cir.  1995),  cert.
denied, 116  S.  Ct.  773  (1996);  United  States  v.  Wagner,  29  F.3d  264, 266  (7th
Cir.  1994);  United  States v.  Laughlin,  10 F.3d  961,  965  (2d Cir.  1993), cert. de-
nied Goldman v.  United  States,  114  S. Ct.  1649  (1994);  United States  v.  Self, 2
F.3d  1071,  1090-91  (10th  Cir.  1993);  United  States v.  Weitzenhoff,  1 F.3d  1523,
1529-30  (9th Cir.  1993),  amended, 35  F.3d  1275,  1284-85  (1994),  cert. denied,
115  S.  Ct. 939  (1995);  United  States  v.  Dean,  969  F.2d  187,  191-92  (6th  Cir.
1992),  cert. denied, 113  S. Ct.  1852  (1993);  United  States v.  Baytank  (Houston),
934 F.2d  599, 612  (5th Cir.  1991);  United  States  v.  Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88-89
(6th Cir.  1991);  United States v.  Hayes Int'l  Corp., 786  F.2d  1499,  1502-03  (11thMENS REA IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
There  are  reasons  to  question  both  these  conclusions  in  their
application  to  felony  sanctions,  which  were  not at issue  in Inter-
national  Minerals, but  are present  in most of the  federal  environ-
mental  criminal  provisions.  Indeed,  even  apart  from  the  absence
of a felony  sanction, International  Minerals provides  virtually  no
support for  a diminished mens  rea with respect to  the  facts  that a
defendant  must know.  Quite  the  opposite  is true.  A  close  reading
of  International Minerals makes  plain  that  the  Court  carefully
avoided  any  such holding.'
The Sweet Home colloquy  is significant  in this  respect as well.
It  reveals  Justice  O'Connor's  awareness  of  the  signs  of  fissure
underlying  the  facade  of settled  lower court precedent  relying  on
International Minerals. Justice  O'Connor  asked  the  government
lawyer in  Sweet Home how  he could  square  his response  that the
government need not prove that the defendant  must know that the
species was  endangered  or even  "at  risk"  with  the  Court's  recent
ruling  (just a  few  weeks  earlier)  in  United States v.  X-Citement
Video. 49  In  X-Citement  Video,  the  Court  construed  "knowingly
violates"  language  in  a  federal  criminal  pornography  statute5 0  to
require  that  the  government  prove  that  the  defendant  knew  that
the  performer  was  a  minor. Justice  O'Connor's  question  brought
into  focus  the  clear  parallel.  If "knowingly"  in  the  pornography
law meant  that the defendant  must know  that the  performer  was  a
minor,  then  "knowingly"  in  the  Endangered  Species  Act  should
mean  that  the  defendant  must  know  that  the  species  was  endan-
gered. When  confronted  with  the government's  response  that  the
defendant  need not know  the law,  the Justice  converted  her ques-
tion  into  one  asking  whether  the  government must  at least prove
knowledge  of the  fact  that  the  species  is  "at  risk,"  wholly  apart
from its formal  designation  as  an "endangered  species.'
Cir.  1986);  United  States  v.  Corbin  Farm  Servs.,  444  F.  Supp.  510,  519-20
(E.D.Cal.), affd, 578 F.2d  259 (9th  Cir.  1978); see Lazarus, Reforming Environ-
mental Criminal Law, supra note  15,  at 2574-76.
48.  Lazarus, Reforming Environmental Criminal  Law, supra note  15,  at 2476-
84.
49.  Sweet Home  Oral Argument  Transcript,  supra note  9,  at  5-6;  see United
States v.  X-Citement  Video,  115  S.  Ct. 464 (1994).
50.  18  U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1),  (2) (1994).
51.  Sweet Home Oral  Argument  Transcript, supra note 9,  at  5.
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The significance  of the  invocation of X-Citement Video  in  the
Sweet Home  oral  argument extends  far  beyond  the  criminal  law
case.  Unlike  environmental  lawyers,  criminal  lawyers  and  Su-
preme  Court  watchers  were  not  at all  surprised by  the  questions
regarding  mens  rea.  The  Court  has  in  recent  years been  increas-
ingly  concerned  with the  construction  of the mens rea element  in
the  definition of federal  crimes.  The Court  has granted  review  in
a  surprisingly  large  number  of  criminal  cases  raising  such  is-
sues.52  Moreover,  a  majority  of  the  Court  has  repeatedly  con-
strued  the  relevant  statutory  language  in  a  manner  that  requires
the  government  to  make  stronger  showings  of  the  defendant's
individual  culpability.53  While  none  of these  previous  cases  has
involved  federal  environmental  law,  the  relevance  of this  emerg-
ing precedent to  environmental  law's criminal  dimension  is direct
and perhaps  even  immediate.
The  Court's  decision  in  Staples v.  United States 54  is  illustra-
tive.  In  Staples, the  Court  held  that  the  government  must  prove
the defendant's  knowledge of all the facts  material to  the offense,
including  that  the  firearm  was  "fully  automatic."55  The  Court
questioned  the propriety  of applying  the  so-called  public  welfare
offense  rationale  in  felony  prosecutions. 6  The  principle  of  stat-
utory  construction  expressed  by  the  public  welfare  offense  doc-
trine  has  served  as  the  precedential  bedrock  within  International
Minerals for  almost  all  of the  lower  court  cases  upholding  the
government's  contention  that  the  government  need  prove  the
defendant's  knowledge  of only minimal facts for criminal  convic-
tion  in  environmental  cases.57  However,  there  is  a  discernible
52.  See,  e.g.,  Cheek  v.  United  States,  498  U.S.  192  (1991);  Posters  "N"
Things,  Ltd.  v.  United  States,  114  S.  Ct.  1747  (1994);  Ratzlaf  v.  United  States,
114  S.  Ct.  655  (1994);  Staples  v.  United States,  114  S.  Ct.  1793  (1994);  United
States v.  X-Citement  Video,  Inc.,  115 S.  Ct. 464  (1994).
53.  William  N.  Eskridge,  Jr.  &  Phillip  P.  Frickey,  The  Supreme  Court-
1993 Term Foreword:  Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARv.  L. REv.  26,  69-71  (1994).
54.  114 S. Ct.  1793  (1994).
55.  Id. at  1795.
56.  Id. at  1804.
57.  United  States  v.  Hopkins,  53 F.3d  533,  537  (2d  Cir.  1995),  cert. denied,
116  S.  Ct.  773  (1996);  United  States  v.  Baytank  (Houston),  Inc.,  934 F.2d  599,
613  (5th  Cir.  1991);  United  States  v.  Hayes  Int'l  Corp.,  786  F.2d  1499,  1503MENS REA  IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
chasm  between,  on  the  one  side,  the  Court's  reasoning  in  cases
like  Staples and X-Citement Video,  and,  on  the  other  side,  lower
court  environmental  cases  sustaining  diminished  mens  rea  in
environmental  felony  prosecutions.  The  Supreme  Court  seems
ready,  when  presented  with  an  appropriate  environmental  felony
prosecution,  to  require  the  government  to  demonstrate  the
defendant's  knowledge  of  far  more  of  those  material  facts  that
defime  the  elements  of  an  offense  than  the  lower  courts  have
required  in recent  years.
The  questions  asked  at  oral  argument  in  Sweet  Home are  not,
however,  the  sole  indicia  of instability  in  current  case  law.  The
substance  of the  government's  responses to  those  questions  un-
derscored  the  tenuousness  of  the  government's  position.  When
asked if the government must  show that the defendant  knows  that
the  species  is  endangered,  the  government answered  in  the nega-
tive, relying  on  the  notion  that ignorance  of the  law is  not a  de-
fense.5 "  Such  an  answer  has  strong,  although  somewhat  criti-
cized,  precedential  support.59  Strictly  speaking,  as  the  Supreme
Court  has explained,  the "ignorance  of the  law"  maxim  does not
apply  where  the  legal  status  of a  particular  fact  is made  an  ele-
ment of the  offense.6 '
The tenuousness  of the government's  position  is most evident,
however,  in  its  response  to  the  question  whether  the  defendant
must  know  that  the  species  is  "at  risk."'"  The  government  an-
swered  in  the  negative,  equating  knowledge  of  that  fact  with
knowledge  of  the  law.62  But  whether  a  species  is  "at  risk"  is
decidedly  not a  question  of law.  It is  a  question  of fact.  More-
over,  since  it is  a  fact  determinative  of whether  a  species  is  en-
dangered,  more  traditional  approaches  to  criminal  law  would
require  the  government  to  prove  the  defendant's  knowledge  of
that fact to establish  the defendant's  culpability.  The government,
however,  blurred  the  distinction  between  law  and  fact  in  its  re-
(11th  Cir.  1986).
58.  Sweet Home Oral Argument  Transcript, supra note 9, at  4-5.
59.  Lazarus, Reforming Environmental Criminal  Law, supra note  15,  at 2478-
84.
60.  Liparota v.  United  States, 471  U.S.  419, 425  n.9  (1985).
61.  Sweet Home Oral Argument  Transcript, supra note 9,  at  5.
62.  Id.
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sponse,  perhaps  for  tactical  purposes.  Regardless  of  the
government's  strategy  here,  just  that  kind  of  blurring  has  been
successful  in prompting  many  lower  courts - under the  guise  of
"ignorance  of the  law  is not a defense"  - to  uphold jury  instruc-
tions  that,  in effect,  transgress  the  parallel  notion  that "ignorance
of the  facts"  may be  a defense.63
Perhaps  aware  of  that  tension,  the  government  ultimately
seemed  to  acknowledge  in  its  responses  that  the  prosecution
would  have  to  prove  the defendant's  knowledge  of at least  some
of the relevant  facts. Justice O'Connor asked  whether in prosecut-
ing  an  individual  for "taking"  a  species  of frog by  "drain[ing]  a
pond on [the defendant's]  property,  you'd have  to know that there
is  a particular  frog or whatever  ...  in  the  water."'  The  govern-
ment  agreed  that  such  proof  would  be  necessary.65  The
government's  response,  which  seems  entirely  consistent  with
traditional  norms of criminal culpability contrasts  sharply,  howev-
er,  with the government's  position  in the  lower courts.  There,  for
example,  the  government  has  argued  that  in  an  endangered  spe-
cies  prosecution  for "taking"  a grizzly  bear, the  government need
not prove  the  defendant's  knowledge  that  the  bear was  a  grizzly
bear  or even  a  bear.  All  that  would be  required  is  proof that the
defendant  knew that he  was harming an animal.  No knowledge  of
the  "particular"  animal  would  be  necessary.  Significantly,  the
lower  courts have agreed.66
The  Sweet  Home  colloquy  may  represent  the  dawning  of  a
debate  likely  to  occur  in  the  near  future  regarding  mens  rea  in
environmental  crime.  Justice  O'Connor's  questions  preview  the
concerns  the  Court  will  have.  That  debate  is  unlikely  to  arise,
however,  in  an  Endangered  Species  Act  case.  Notwithstanding
anecdotes  to  the  contrary,67  criminal  prosecutions  under  the  En-
63.  Lazarus,  Reforming Environmental  Criminal Law, supra note  15,  at  2471-
73, 2476-77.
64.  Sweet  Home  Oral  Argument  Transcript,  supra note  9,  at  6  (emphasis
added).
65.  Id.
66.  See,  e.g.,  United  States v.  St. Onge,  676 F. Supp.  1044  (W.D. Mo.  1988);
United States  v.  Dion,  762 F.2d  674 (8th  Cir.  1985); United  States  v.  Billie,  667
F. Supp.  1485  (S.D. Fla. 1987).
67.  Compare Mark  Arax, Immigrant Farmer's Woes  Galvanize Conserva-MENS REA IN ENVTL.  CRIM. LAW
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IV.  CONCLUSION
There  are  strong  moral  overtones  to  environmental  law,  and
deservedly  so.  Yet,  the  same moral justifications  that  warrant  the
emergence  of environmental  crime also supply limits on its legiti-
mate  scope.  By  failing  to  respect  or  even  appearing  to  neglect
those  bounds,  we risk  no  less  than  the  erosion  of the  underlying
substantive  environmental  protection  standards  themselves.  So
while  the  environmental  community  and  federal  government
celebrate  their  important  win  in  Sweet  Home,  they  should  take
heed  not  to  overlook  in  that  celebration  the  significant  warning
raised  at  oral  argument  regarding  the  proper  scope  of  environ-
mental  crime.  Otherwise,  the  present  victory  may  become  the
unwitting  antecedent  of a  far greater loss.